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An adaptive governance system strives to enhance the capacity of institutions to better coordinate relief
operations, public awareness and risk reduction policy in case of natural or man-made disasters, by
promoting learning from experience. The contribution of this article is twofold: (1) to establish an as-
sessment framework for the adaptive capacity of a system in the field of disasters, and (2) to explore the
governance system of Mt. Merapi volcano, Indonesia. We chose the Merapi volcano in the wake of the
large 2010 eruption, the largest event over the past 140 years. We develop and apply an assessment
framework for the adaptive capacity of a system with the following six key parameters: (1) system
description, (2) technology, (3) infrastructure, (4) institutions, (5) information and skills, and (6) eco-
nomic and financial resources. The methodology consists of a qualitative analysis, using a text analysis.
The data have been collected from a field survey, which was conducted after the 2010 volcanic eruption
and rain-triggered lahars on Mt. Merapi in central Java. We underline a number of challenges, such as
apparent lack of appropriate infrastructures, complex interactions across institutions, dependence on
funds from external parties, and limited quantitative documentation on both human and material loss,
which may weaken the adaptive capacity of the system. More efforts are therefore needed in order to
improve the adaptive capacity and, thus, the adaptive governance at Mt. Merapi. This study represents a
significant step toward enhancing our understanding of the adaptive governance approach in developing
countries.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Natural hazards have the potential to impose significant social
and economic costs. For the period 1980–2003, the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change [1] estimates that the economic
loss due to natural disasters reached USD 1 trillion. We underline
the difference between natural hazards, which are geophysical92130 Issy Les Moulineaux,
. Bakkour),
ast@supagro.inra.fr (R. Kast),
o.co.id (B. Prihatminingtyas).events such as volcanic eruptions, and disasters, which involve the
interaction of natural hazards with social systems [2–7]. While
hazards themselves cannot be prevented, the damage induced by
these extreme events may be disastrous, if they cannot be sig-
nificantly reduced. By “hazard”, we mean a threat. Hazard is
broadly defined as “a potentially damaging physical event, phe-
nomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or in-
jury, property damage, social and economic disruption or en-
vironmental degradation” [8]. Hence, a hazard is understood as
some influence that may adversely affect a valued attribute of a
system. A hazard is generally but not always external to the system
under consideration [8]. Besides, the term “disaster” is what we
refer to when a major event hits unprepared population.
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resilience: “it is a convulsion in the social system but not ne-
cessarily (indeed not usually), a decisive one”. Acting on variable
scales and leading to different consequences, disasters remain
subjective in as much it is “what its victims and participants
perceive it to be” [9]. According to the Center for Research on the
Epidemiology for Disasters (CRED), an event qualifies as a disaster
if at least one of the following criteria is fulfilled: 10 or more
fatalities are reported; 100 or more people are reported affected,
injured, and/or homeless; the government declares a state of
emergency; or the government requests international assistance
[10]. Moreover, a disaster is a unique event. Each time one occurs,
the ingredients, the controlling parameters and the outcome
variables are present in unique mixtures. But disasters are also
subject to generalization [9].
In general, governance consists of institutional structures, and
is concerned with the ways in which societies can organize
themselves to accomplish their goals [11]. The concept of gov-
ernance can be related to a given socio-ecological system that is
potentially exposed to different hazards. By system we mean an
organization, such as a coupled human-environment system, a
population group, an economic sector, a geographical region, or a
natural system. This notion of systemwas put forward by Füssel as
the main component of the assessment framework for the concept
of vulnerability [8]. The governance of a system refers to me-
chanisms by which the agents articulate their interests in order to
accomplish their goals (e.g. conservation of natural resources,
management of natural hazards). The governance refers also to
institutions that influence the exercise of power within the con-
cerned entities (e.g. a firm, a multinational company, a country or
a region). Finally, the governance of a system can be described by a
participatory interaction among stakeholders at all levels (e.g. the
public and private sector, civil society and international organi-
zations) [12].
In particular, environmental governance is the system of in-
stitutions, including rules, laws, regulations, policies, social norms,
and organizations involved in governing environmental resource
use and/or protection. There are a variety of different approaches,
one of them, emergent, being adaptive governance [13]. The
adaptive governance consists in social structures and processes
linking individuals, organizations, agencies and institutions at
multiple organizational levels [14,15]. This governance model
considers policies and management approaches to be part of a
knowledge accumulation process or learning process that results
in new approaches that are better able to accommodate un-
certainty and surprise [16–18]. Therefore, an adaptive governance
approach is put forward as an alternative method of managing
complex social-environmental problems including disasters
[19,20]. Accordingly, Djalante et al. stated: “Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion is a systematic approach to manage disaster risks while
adaptive governance is suggested as an alternative approach for
governing complex problems such as disasters” [21].
In the field of natural disasters, adaptive governance aims to
improve the adaptive capacity of a system by promoting learning
processes from the results of management strategies that have
already been implemented [16–18,22]. In this respect, the adaptive
capacity of a system has emerged from a conceptual distinction
between “exploitation”, that is, the capacity to benefit from ex-
isting forms of collective action, and “exploration”, that is, the
capacity of governance to nurture learning and experimentation
[23,24]. In other words, the improvement of the adaptive capacity
of a system seems to be the main objective of an adaptive gov-
ernance model. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[1] defines the adaptive capacity as the ability of a system to adjust
to climate change, mitigate potential damages, benefit from op-
portunities, or to cope with consequences. However, componentsdetermining adaptive capacity and resilience are not easily sepa-
rated. This article provides insights into actions that could be ta-
ken to improve the adaptive capacity of a system that faces
disasters.
A growing number of researchers argue that the adaptive
governance can increase resilience to natural hazards. Folke et al.
presented adaptive governance as the social contexts necessary to
actively manage resilience in social-ecological systems [20]. The
concept of resilience has emerged in risk assessment in order to
account for the adaptive capacity of urban systems [9,25]. This
concept of resilience is increasingly associated with research in
vulnerability, and adaptive capacity [26,27]. We understand resi-
lience as the ability of a system potentially exposed to hazards to
withstand perturbations or shocks [28,29], by resisting or chan-
ging in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of func-
tioning and structure [30,31]. Djalante et al. highlighted the four
characteristics of adaptive governance that are important to help
increase resilience to natural hazards [32]. These are polycentric
and multilayered institutions, participation and collaboration, self-
organization and networks, and learning and innovation. Adger
et al. suggested that a multilevel governance system for disaster
management enables enhancement of capacity to deal with un-
certainties through mobilization of different sources of resilience
[33]. Taking the example of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, they
argued that the existence of formal and informal institutions as
well as large-scale international response helped the affected
countries to cope with and recover from the impacts quicker and
better, and even permitted the use of the tsunami as a window of
opportunity for building long-term community resilience. Based
on similar cases, a report by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) revealed that the Indonesian national platform
for disaster risk reduction was formed smoothly due to the ex-
istence of a previous analogous entity supported by the recent law
24/2007 on Disaster Management [34].
This article investigates the adaptive capacity and thus the
adaptive governance around the Mt. Merapi volcano system. This
volcano, located in Central Java, is one of the most active and
dangerous composite volcanoes of Indonesia [35] since its erup-
tions occur every 2–6 years on average over the past 100 years and
it is home to 1.4 million people [36,37]. The volcano is located in
two provinces (Central Java and Yogyakarta Special Region) and in
four districts (Boyolali, Magelang and Klaten districts belong to
Central Java Province and Sleman district belongs to Yogyakarta
Special Region) (Fig. 1). The focus of our study is the October-
November 2010 volcanic eruption of Mt. Merapi whose Volcanic
Explosivity Index of 4 (on a scale of 1 to 8) has led researchers to
call this eruption the largest ever since 1872 in Java [38]. Data from
the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB, Badan Nasional
Penanggulangan Bencana) indicate that after the 2010 Merapi
eruption, a total of 367 people were killed and another 277 injured
[39]. The evacuation operation led to displacement of almost
400,000 people living within 20 km from the summit for one and
a half months [40]. However, after the eruptive phase, another
threat endangered local communities: rain-triggered lahars. The
Indonesian term “lahar” is used for a mixture of debris and water,
other than stream flow, that flows on volcano slopes at relatively
high speed [41]. Rain-triggered lahars devastated several villages
on the west and south flank of Merapi in 2011 and 2012 [42,43].
The Mt. Merapi case study is of major interest as it broadens
our knowledge regarding the adaptive capacity in developing
countries that face natural disasters, in particular as the risk
management system in Merapi has proven to be successful in
previous disasters. The Center for Volcanology and Geological
Hazard Mitigation (CVGHM) displayed an updated hazard map for
Merapi, as an input for contingency planning that took place in
2009 [41]. However, the rapid onset and large magnitude of the
Fig. 1. Location, setting of Merapi volcano in central Java and hazard-zone map [29]. (A) Location of Merapi volcano, the southernmost and youngest volcano of a 165°-
trending range of composite cones comprising, from N to S: Ungaran, Telomojo, Merbabu and Merapi volcanoes and surrounding cities. (B) SPOT-5 image of the Merapi-
Merbabu area from 10 june 2011, looking NW and draped on an SRTM-DEM. Merapi hazard zones (KRB I–III), as redefined after the 2010 eruption and comprising first,
second and third hazard zones are outlined.
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adaptive capacity of Mt. Merapi. Indonesian researchers and in-
ternational teams have extensively studied Mt. Merapi volcano,
leading to improved understanding of many aspects of the volca-
nic eruptive processes and aftermath [38]. Recently, Mei et al. [40]
studied the evacuation management system of the 2010 eruption
of Merapi. But, to our knowledge, none of these studies has ex-
plicitly highlighted the governance system that might affect the
way in which local communities cope with volcanic eruptions.
The study of governance appears to be a key parameter in the
management of large natural disasters. Since the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1992, much experience has been
gained to manage large volcanic crises by creating risk zoning
maps, improving communications, targeting evacuations and re-
housing [44]. These lessons found an application in cases as di-
verse as the Ubinas eruption in Peru, which lasted three years from
2006 to 2008 and resumed in 2013. In that circumstance, in-
stitutions in charge of risk management had to adapt and de-
monstrate their agility [45]. The creation of hazard zone maps as
well as the preparation of contingency plans by local authorities
appeared to be a key point. Another interesting case study is the
Kelut eruption in Indonesia in 2007, which was sudden. Risk
management efforts suffered from an inability of institutions to
take decisions while the communication between the population
and the authorities failed [46]. These recent case studies need to
be complemented by an in-depth analysis of a very large eruption
in a densely populated area, in a context where governance is al-
ready set up at the time of the crisis. The main question is to
understand whether institutions in charge of the risk management
exhibit an adaptive capacity to face such challenge.
The methodology of this article consists of literature review
and analysis of qualitative data survey. Our field survey is based on
face-to-face interviews, conducted from January to April 2011, just
following the eruption in the Mt. Merapi area. The collected in-
formation was analyzed both manually and by using the text
analysis software Tropes
s
. The software's statistical and linguistic
algorithms enable researchers to see connections andrelationships in respondents’ answers. Such discourse analysis
aims at facilitating the understanding of the adaptive capacity of
institutions in charge of risk management.
The introduction presents the problem and states the objec-
tives of this study. Section 2 describes the material and the
methodology. Section 3 shows the main findings. Section 4 dis-
cusses the hypotheses and limitations of the study, and Section 5
highlights the main results.2. Material and method
Our methodology includes a literature review and analysis of
qualitative data survey. We developed a general assessment fra-
mework of the adaptive capacity of a system with six interrelated
parameters, which complement one another (Table 1). This paper
presents a generally applicable assessment framework for the
adaptive capacity of a system in the field of disasters that com-
bines six fundamental parameters: context or system description,
technology, infrastructure, institutions, information and skills, and
economic and financial resources.
Earlier attempts at studying disasters were limited to a specific
approach, with a particular focus on environmental, natural and
industrial disasters. In this respect, we can cite Füssel [8] who
underlined the importance of a system, as the main component of
the assessment framework for the concept of vulnerability to cli-
mate change. Surono et al. [39] stressed on the technology com-
ponent of a system and showed that the magnitude of precursory
signals (seismicity, ground deformation, gas emissions) were
proportional to the large size and intensity of the 2010 Mt. Merapi
eruption. Mei et al. [40] highlighted the infrastructure and logistics
conditions during the 2010 evacuations at Merapi volcano. Baker
and Refsgaard [16] and Chau et al. [47] studied, respectively, the
case of the Katrina hurricane and the extreme flood events in
Vietnam. They both concluded that large-scale disasters require
increased coordination and higher levels of institutional flexibility.
Kuhlicke and Steinführer [31] emphasized in their report the role
Table 1
Key parameters for an assessment framework of the adaptive capacity of a system.
Parameters Explanation
1. System description Shows whether or not populations are aware of the risk at stake. It comprises the geographical component (locality), the com-
munity (region or population group), the hazard, the valued attributes (human life, properties, and agricultural land) and the time
scale (short or long-term consequences).
2. Technology Indicates the technical side of a system. It consists of the implementation and the use of technology while dealing with hazards,
such as warning systems, detection instruments, programs, maps and communication tools.
3. Infrastructure Consists of listing whether or not appropriate infrastructure is available. Such listing may contain improved engineering for
buildings, dams, shelters, hospitals, sanitization facilities or roads.
4. Institutions Detects the existence of formal and informal arrangements. It consists of detecting for what institutions exist on purpose, and for
whose interest they exist, persist, or change. Examples of institutions are: land-use planning and management to prevent set-
tlement in dangerous areas, enforcement of building codes and enforcement of property right laws.
5. Information and skills Indicates the knowledge and the capacity level of a system to face future disasters. A key element is to understand if the likelihood
of a disaster, i.e. its precursory event, is sufficient to warrant the mobilization of resources (e.g. the precautionary principle).
6. Economic and financial
resources
Indicates whether or not a system is able to hedge possible loss from disaster. Among economic and financial resources, this
encompasses: available funds, public saving in cash or livestock, budgetary situation, compensation, and risk sharing through
insurance, reinsurance, and other financial products (bonds, actions, credits, and derivatives).
Key: The choice of the six key parameters is influenced by the literature review presented in Section 2. The adaptive capacity of a system is evaluated by assessing both the
facilitating and limiting factors for each of the six parameters of the assessment framework.
Table 2
General profile of interviewees (gender, age, work status).
Respondents
Gender 16 males and 2 females
Age 25 to 60 (average 45 years old)
Work status Positions related to risk management process
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[10] highlighted economic losses caused by geophysical and hy-
dro-meteorological events. We assembled all these components
into one assessment framework. In our opinion, these parameters
describe different facets of the adaptive capacity of a system.
Our holistic interpretation of the adaptive governance system
seeks a better reconstitution of a given system. This assessment
framework can improve our understanding of the extent of input
(e.g. internal and external resources, technological level and
knowledge) that a system possesses, while dealing with industrial
or natural disasters, etc.
The sequence of the chosen parameters is related to the
chronological occurrence of disasters. At the pre-disaster phase,
we underline the system description, the use of technology, and
the presence of appropriate infrastructures. At the disaster phase,
we stress on the existence of solid institutions, and the commu-
nication of information. At the post-disaster phase, we highlight
the importance of economic and financial resources in order to
cover possible loss. Each key parameter highlights a specific side of
the adaptive capacity of a system, as potentially exposed to ha-
zards (Table 1). For example, the availability of critical infra-
structure or the use of appropriate technology is more likely to
promote an adaptive capacity of the system.
Then, we apply our assessment framework to the system fo-
cused on volcanic risk management, especially around Mt. Merapi
volcano in central Java (Fig. 1). Indonesia has been deeply affected
by a range of disasters in recent years, and has a great “potential”
for future disasters.
We conducted 18 face-to-face interviews with people in charge
of risk management in Indonesia, in February–March 2011, three
months after the Mt. Merapi eruption. The main surveys were
carried out in the neighbourhood of Mt. Merapi, both in villages
affected by the eruption and in the capital of the affected regions
(districts of Magelang and Sleman). In order to understand the
specificities of the Indonesian system devoted to natural disasters
and volcanic risk management, we complemented these surveys
with interviews in the neibourghood of Mt. Semeru volcano (re-
gency of Lumajang), another persistently active composite cone
located in east Java Island, which shares many characteristics
(eruptive activity, hazards, high density of population, etc.) with
Mt. Merapi. The combination of the two sites offers an interesting
overview of how risk management is perceived and performed in
Indonesia, especially in the light of a major eruption widelypublicized.
Interviewees were chosen based on the personal experiences of
chiefs of villages and planning or rescue staff regarding volcanic
risk management and the institutions they depend on. While we
could not carry on surveys with the national institutions located in
the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, we were able to survey all re-
levant institutions at the local scale: districts and sub-districts,
municipality, village, and hamlets. The survey comprises 41
questions distributed under six themes (Appendix 1): (1) risk of
lahars to which the region is exposed (6 questions), (2) manage-
ment of lahar risk (3 questions), (3) occurrence of a volcanic or
lahar disaster (10 questions), (4) improvement of the financial
responses to lahar damages (4 questions), (5) decision making
process about lahar risk (5 questions), and (6) preparation and
planning for projects (13 questions). We note that collected data
were translated from Indonesian and Javanese languages into
English.
People in charge of risk management consider volcanic erup-
tion as the most important hazard related to their environment.
Their education level ranges from primary school to university.
The general profile of our interviewees is presented in Table 2 and
Table 3.
We carried out a manual and a computer-based analysis of the
content of a questionnaire (Appendix 1). Interviews allowed us a
preliminary approach to the adaptive capacity as experienced in
the 2010 Merapi crisis. After adding answers to each question in a
text file, we used the text analysis software Tropes
s
(version 8.1).
Discourse analysis is particularly pertinent for the analysis of
qualitative research [48–50]. The software's statistical and lin-
guistic algorithms clustered and classified the data and identified
trends through concept maps or constellations. This generates an
Table 3
Detailed profile of interviewees (location and volcano, and task).
Location and volcano Task
Magelang (city) Mount Merapi Head of SAR, Magelang
Kaliurang (village) Mount Merapi Head of SIBAT, Kaliurang
Yogyakarta (city) Mount Merapi Professor, Head of PSBA
Srumbung (village) Mount Merapi Chief of Srumbung village
Blongkeng (village) Mount Merapi Secretary of Blongkeng village and shelter management
Agomulyo (village) Mount Merapi Head of social and management section in Agomulyo village
Bronggang (hamlet) Mount Merapi Chief of Bronggang hamlet
Kaliurang (village) Mount Merapi Retired
Mt. Sawur Mount Semeru Staff on Mt. Sawur observatory
Lumajang (city) Mount Semeru Control for improvement and expansion
Lumajang (city) Mount Semeru Engineer
Lumajang (city) Mount Semeru SAR Trainer
Candipuro (village) Mount Semeru Planning Staff
Pasrujambe (village) Mount Semeru Flood information official on Besuksat River, member of rescue team
Pasrujambe (village) Mount Semeru Staff in Pasrujambe Sub-District
Pasrujambe (village) Mount Semeru Chief of Pasrujambe village
Kamituwo (hamlet) Mount Semeru Chief of Kamituwo hamlet
Pronojiwo (village) Mount Semeru Entrepreneur
Abbreviations and acronyms:
SAR: National Search and Rescue Agency.
PSBA UGM: Research Center for Disasters, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
Key: As shown in the table, our interviewees have gained experience in disaster management on the slopes of Mt. Semeru and Mt. Merapi,
two volcanoes subject to frequent eruptions whose slopes are regurlay affected by lahars and mudflows.
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stantives that would be difficult to achieve using the constant
comparative method. The software's algorithms also generate
linguistic analyses of the style of the text and connection of con-
cepts for every corpus we analyse. The term “reference” designates
one or more words sharing the same root and having similar
meanings. Moreover, the software allows a graphic presentation of
the relationships of words to a chosen reference.
The area graph (Fig. 2) shows the relationships between the
reference “catastrophe”, one of the most used sentences in our
surveys, and other references. In this area graph, each reference
appears as a sphere, whose surface is proportional to the number
of words it contains. The central reference is “catastrophe”. The
references on the left are its predecessors, those on the right its
successors in the text of our interviewees. The distance between
the central class and other classes is proportional to the number of
relationships connecting them.Fig. 2. Connections between the reference “Catastrophe” and oAccordingly, we note that the two classes “catastrophe” and
“communication” are close together, which implies that they share
many relationships. Moreover, in the discourse, “communication”
and “social groups” are mentioned before the catastrophe, which
reflects the importance of collective prevention before a disaster
occurs. After a catastrophe, the surveyed people are first aware of
population's health. Then, they consider the main problems of
river conditions (waterway), communications, food, housing and
security. Questions related to law and to business appear to be
secondary compared to these fundamental issues.3. Results
This section will expand our knowledge of the communication
linkages around Mt. Merapi, the chronological phases of volcanic
eruptions and actions taken around the volcano, and the adaptivether references. Our data set was processed using Tropes.
Fig. 3. Flow diagram of the administrative levels and the communication chains in the area of Mt. Merapi. BNPB: Badan Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster
Management Agency). BPBD: Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Regional Disaster Management Agency). CVGHM: Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard
Mitigation.
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3.1. Communication linkages around Mt. Merapi
The Law of the Republic of Indonesia, no. 24/2007 defines ob-
jectives of risk mitigation, roles and responsibilities of government
and stakeholders, as well as funding sources for disaster man-
agement [51]. According to this law the entire management sys-
tem is placed under the supervision of the President of the Re-
public in order to manage all types of natural and man made
disasters. Furthermore, the power and legitimacy to act is given to
the National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB), which was
established by the same law. BNPB is represented by local agencies
named BPDB (Local Disaster Management Agency) and located at
different institutional scales (Province and District). The BNPB
does not work individually, but in cooperation with various de-
partments, agencies and institutions. For example, in search and
rescue of victims of disasters, BNPB collaborates with the National
Army, the National Police, Basarnas (Indonesian Search and Res-
cue) and PMI (Indonesian Red Cross). To manage displaced per-
sons, the BNPB cooperates with the Ministry of Social Affairs. For
mapping areas at risk, the BNPB works with BIG (National Bureau
of Spatial Information) and departments and agencies to deal with
special risk. In the warning system organization in case of disaster,
the BNPB works with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Re-
sources and BMKG (Meteorogical, Climatology and Geophysics
Agency) for geological risks, the Ministry of Public Works, the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Forestry, LAPAN (National
Space Agency) for hydro-meteorogical hazards, supported by stu-
dies conducted by the Ministry of Research and Technology, LIPI(institute of Science) and universities across Indonesia. For disaster
risk reduction education purposes, the BNPB works also with the
Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Religious Affairs and
the Ministry of Communication and Media [52]. The mechanism of
distribution of donations is based on the Regulations of Chief BNPB
no.7 2008. Aid from donors is delivered to the Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) camps, under the coordination of BNPB and BPBD.
The flow diagram of management system and communication
linkages, emphasizing connections between scientists, govern-
ment administrations, private organizations, and the public is
presented in Fig. 3. The administrative levels in Indonesia are as
follows: national, province, district, sub-district, municipality, and
village. A municipality encompasses several villages. In order to
monitor volcanic activity, five observatory posts have been in-
stalled around the Merapi volcano since 1950–1970s. Information
about the eruptive condition and the behaviour of the volcano is
reported from each of the observatory posts to CVGHM's Volcano
Investigation and Technology Development Office (BPPTK) and to
the Merapi Volcano Observatory (MVO, a section of BPPTK) in
Yogyakarta and then transmitted to CVGHM. The information on
volcanic activity is regularly reported to local governments (i.e. the
head of district). The BPBD is the coordinator of crisis manage-
ment. Thus, the head of district together with BPBD coordinates
each department involved in the crisis management. At the local
scale, the chiefs of villages together with the chiefs of sub-villages
and local organizations, and with the help of army, police, NGOs
and volunteers prepare the emergency and evacuation plan.
However, if the danger is imminent, the BPPTK can use sirens to
inform people directly to evacuate. The volcanic crisis manage-
ment is organized in each of the districts and is based on the
Table 4
Chronological events of volcanic activity, actions taken, and loss.
Source: this survey, [39,40,52].
Warning leveln-Radius of
danger zone (KRB)
Volcanic activity Actions taken Loss, IDPSsnn, and problems faced
1. Pre-eruption stage (20 september–25 october 2010)
Sep. 20th II–10 km Dramatic increase in all monitored
parameters
CVGHMnnn: need to evacuate tens of thousands of people. 1. No human and material loss.
2. Mbah Marijan, the “gatekeeper of Merapi” refused to
leave his house in Kinahrejo.
3. Some refusals to evacuate despite orders.
Oct. 21th III–10 km Release of information related to preparation for evacuation.
Oct. 25th IV–10 km 1. Maximal level of the warning system.
2. Local authorities: evacuation of persons with special access and functional
needs, the elderly, children and pregnant women, for the villagers living in
KRB III.
3. CVGHM: warning that there was a high probability of an unprecedented
explosive eruption.
2. Initial explosion (26 october–02 november 2010)
Oct. 26th IV–10 km 1. First explosive eruption.
2. Production of a 12 km-high ash
plume and PDCsnnnnn.
1. CVGHM: order to evacuate 12 municipalities (total of 24,024 habitants)
located in the KRB III.
2. Local authorities: order to evacuate people in the danger zone.
3. BPPTKnnnn: release of monitoring and recommendations data every six
hours.
1. 35 people (Marijan and 34 others) died.
2. 22,599 IDPSs.
Oct. 30th IV–10 km Army, Police and rescue teams: evacuation of the dead and injured, and
searching for missing people.
53,048 IDPSs.
3. Increased eruption intensity (03–04 november 2010)
Nov. 3 rd IV–15 km CVGHM: recommendation to evacuate 32 municipalities (total of 90,325 ha-
bitants) located in the KRB III.
76,031 IDPSs.
Nov. 4th IV–15 km Paroxysmal eruption took place. CVGHM: extent of the danger zone to 20 km from the summit and call for
evacuation.
1. 82,701 IDPSs.
2. No refugee camps beyond 20 km to accommodate the
IDPs.
3. Evacuations were taking place spontaneously.
4. Sustained explosive eruptions (05–13 november 2010)
Nov. 5th IV–20 km 1. Paroxysmal eruptions for 24 con-
tinuous hours.
2. Ash fell in the region west and
south of the vent.
3. PDCs reached 16 km from the
summit in the Gendol River.
Local authorities of the Sleman district: preparation of a new IDP camp in
Maguwoharjo football stadium (located 23 km from Merapi).
1. About 200 people died.
2. 239,618 IDPSs.
3. CVGHM did not communicate the list of villages to be
evacuated.
4. Misunderstanding by some of the emergency managers.
5. All IDP camps were located inside the restricted zone.
Nov. 8th IV Volcanic activity started to decrease in
intensity.
Most of the IDP camps utilized after the main explosion were public buildings
(schools, hospitals, stadiums, village halls, and universities) or even residents’
houses or yards.
Local authorities faced logistical difficulties (e.g. recording
IDPs, distributing aid and assistance).
Nov. 13th IV Decrease in the explosive activity of the
volcano.
381,696 IDPSs.
5. Decreased volcanic activity (14–19 November 2010)
Nov. 14th IV 20–15–10 km Decrease of the explosive activity of the
volcano.
CVGHM: recommended decreasing the radius of the danger zone as follows:
maintaining a radius of 20 km for the sector between the Boyong and Gendol
rivers (mainly within Sleman District), but reducing the radius to 15 km for
Magelang District and to 10 km for Klaten and Boyolali Districts.
1. 399,403 IDPSs, reaching a peak level.
2. 464,328 habitants in the restricted area.
Nov. 19th IV 1. 272,124 IDPSs.
2. Many IDPSs were closed
3. Concentration in one central camp in Maguwoharjo.
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3.2. Chronological phases of volcanic eruptions and actions taken at
Mt. Merapi
The review of the chronology of volcanic activity in 2010 and
actions taken has enabled us to better understand how the Mt.
Merapi system reacted to disasters. The 2010 Merapi eruption
began on the 26 of October. In response to the increasing volcanic
activity, a number of strategic actions had been taken (e.g. warning
and evacuation). At the pre-eruption and the initial eruption
stages (from 20 September to 2 October 2010), the actions taken
by the CVHM met the population expectations and needs. How-
ever, as the eruption lasted about three weeks, the lack of pre-
paredness and readiness for coping with the volcanic activity put
into question the adaptive capacity of Mt. Merapi system. The
increased eruption intensity led to hundreds of fatalities (in-
habitants who refused to evacuate or returned to their villages
during the eruption) and to numerous logistics problems (e.g.
spontaneous evacuation, insufficient shelters, poorly organised aid
distribution).
Overall, we distinguish six chronological stages of the 2010 Mt.
Merapi eruption [39,40,52]. These stages are chained in Table 4
with respect to the changes observed in volcanic activity and the
undertaken actions. Besides, every explosive eruption of Mt.
Merapi volcano is usually followed by frequent rain-triggered la-
hars in the rainy season, which occur weeks to months after an
eruption (between October and May). Triggered lahars reflect the
long-term impacts of explosive eruptions. Over 240 rain-triggered
lahars were recorded during the 2010–2011 rainy season between
October 2010 and May 2011, and 42 at the beginning of the 2011–
2012 rainy season between October 2011 and January 2012
[39,42]. Lahars generated avulsions (sudden overbank and shift of
the river channel towards another non-flooded channel) on the
distal slopes of Merapi volcano, potentially creating major dis-
asters in densely populated areas [42,43].
3.3. Adaptive capacity of the Mt. Merapi system
Given the 2010 disaster’s magnitude (VEI of 4, volume of 70
million m3 of pyroclastic debris, 367 fatalities and 399,403 in-
ternally displaced persons), actors of the disaster management
hierarchy (Fig. 3) had to deal with a critical situation. Their deci-
sions contributed to mitigate the impact of the disaster (e.g. eva-
cuation operations, information dissemination, and aid distribu-
tion). Moreover, the total of 367 fatalities is relatively small com-
pared to the number of people (10,000 to 20,000 people) who
might have died without the evacuations [39]. Given this situation,
this section aims at measuring the adaptive capacity in Mt. Merapi
system. As noted earlier, the assessment of the adaptive capacity of
a system depends on six interrelated parameters. We will measure
the role of these parameters, as experienced by our interviewees
and noticed in the field. Fig. 4 presents various aspects of our
fieldwork after the eruption.
3.3.1. System description
The analysis of our respondents’ answers highlights the critical
context in which communities operate (Table 5). All respondents
confirmed that they have already witnessed a volcanic eruption
and a mudflow directly in Indonesia, mostly in 2010 and 2011. The
village appears to be the main relevant unit for risk management,
even if decisions are taken at an upper level. Information is thus
provided directly at the local scale to all people concerned by the
volcano. Such proximity is the best way to communicate in-
formation that may be acknowledged by local people.
The slopes of Mt Merapi in February 2011. At the 
foreground, destructions by pyroclastic surges and
lahars. At the background, remaining inhabitants
(here: Gendol River).
An example of broken dam on the slopes of Mt 
Merapi. Many facilities against floods and lahars 
were destroyed following the eruption (here: Woro 
River).
People who lost their home were given the 
opportunity to live in shelters established close to 
their ancient village but outside river channels
(here: Cangkringan village).
The volcano is a source of benefits for many people 
who extract building material from flooded valleys 
(here: Magelang village).
An example of survey performed within risk 
management institutions (here: SIBAT, Kaliurang 
village).
The eruption emphasized the key role of 
observatories in risk prevention (here: Kaliurang).
Fig. 4. Various aspects of our fieldwork after the eruption of Mt Merapi (pictures: G. Enjolras).
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Monitoring and warning systems have been set up in all rivers
that drain the flanks of the Mt. Merapi volcano. The early warning
system around Mt. Merapi is based on the analysis of instrumental
and visual observations for a better accuracy. These two kinds of
analyses are complementary because the onset of an eruption can
be forecasted using seismographs while the sudden outbreak of a
lahar can only be perceived in the field.
For the majority of our respondents (94%), risk assessment re-
lies on identified indicators, such as rainfall intensity and duration
(which leads to an increase in river water level) and delivered
information by local residents to the public. These indicators allow
them to identify the intensity and the likelihood of the expectedhazard. However, they may be subjective or based on rudimentary
instruments. A respondent stated that flood might occur “when-
ever the rain falls heavily”. Another respondent added, “As an
indicator, there is a water level gauge, measured in high and low
river stage, using a light bulb. If the bulb is broken, it means that
the water is high”. Indeed, a monitoring system existed before the
eruption but was severely damaged. During the weeks that im-
mediately followed the eruption, the system was updated and
resized to facilitate observations of the volcano and the valleys
while improving radio communications. Further, the implication of
local youth (supervised by people from NGOs, universities and
volcanologists) in lahars risk monitoring and disaster risk reduc-
tion becomes important since the awareness of lahars’ hazard
Table 5
The most recurrent “References”, “Verbs” and “Adjectives” in the themes “Early
warning and risk monitoring”, as generated by Tropes. Numbers in brackets in-
dicate the number of occurrences.
References 1. Crises: Lahar (60), River (25), Calamity (22), Alarm (20), Vol-
cano (19).
2. Dates: 2010 (10), 2011 (9).
3. Locations: Village (17), Merapi (14), Area (10).
4. Communication & Medias: Information (14), Guard (8), In-
struction (4).
5. Social Groups: People (12), Leader (11), Refugee (7) and In-
habitant (5).
Verbs 1. Verbs of state: to Be (50), to Know (5), to Happen (4).
2. Verbs of action: to Face (18), to Evacuate (8), to Announce (6).
Adjectives 1. Local (7), Warning (5), Dangerous (4), Public (4), Urgent (5).
Key: The table reflects the dangerous context in which communities operate, al-
though they are aware of the risk of volcanic eruption. One respondent stated:
“People live very close to the lahar. With limited funds, people do not want to move
from there”. The early warning system around Mt. Merapi is based on the analysis
of instrumental and visual observations.
Table 6
The most recurrent “References”, “Verbs” and “Adjectives” in the themes “Im-
provement projects”, as generated by Tropes. Numbers in brackets indicate the
number of occurrences.
References 1. Locations: Villages (36), District (5), Location (3).
2. Crisis: Calamity (9), Victim (8), Emergency (4), Risk (3).
3. Health, Life & Casualties: House (16), Health (3).
4. Business & Industry: Benefit (10), Cost (5), Economy (3), Elec-
tricity (3).
Verbs 1. Verbs of state: to Be (47), to Have (11).
2. Verbs of action: to Build (5), to Support (5).
Adjectives 1. Temporary (19), Public (6), Local (3), Urgent (3).
Key: Local inhabitants consider project impact as positive because they feel safer
and more motivated to work during their temporary stay in shelters. Our re-
spondents underline the improvement of the economic and sanitation conditions
(electricity, water).
D. Bakkour et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13 (2015) 167–188176increases. Local youth helped evacuate residents (especially chil-
dren, women and elderly people) and kept them away from the
flood plain of the rivers.
3.3.3. Infrastructure
Infrastructure facilities (e.g. dams, bridges, public bathing and
shelters) are not adequate to cope with large-scale disasters. In the
aftermath of the 2010 volcanic eruption, a large number of bridgesTable 7
Three categories of institutions are acting around Mt. Merapi. Numbers in brackets
indicate the number of occurrences.
Institutions Examples
1. Local Governments (LG) District and Sub-district, municipality, village,
police and army, department of public works,
department of health.
2. Civil Society Organiza-
tions (CSO)
Rescue team, private companies.
3. Community Re-
presentatives (CR)
Village chief.
Key: There is a strong coordination among institutions in Mt. Merapi with a
growing involvement of NGOs and private organizations.and roads were destroyed, isolating many villages. For the first
time, Merapi eruptions resulted in major disruptions of air traffic
in Yogyakarta (2463 flights were cancelled [40]).
In order to improve this relatively poor infrastructure, a num-
ber of projects have been conducted, especially in 2011. The re-
spondents included in our survey provided information regarding
seven projects (Table 6) that aim to improve the capacity to cope
with future crisis, such as building temporary shelters, evacuating
villages, providing clean water, mapping, and determining eva-
cuation routes. Improvement projects are mostly co-financed by
national organizations, and NGOs, such as the Government, the
Indonesian Red Cross, the Denmark Red Cross, the Japanese gov-
ernment and private organizations.
People and infrastructure at stake are mostly located in some
villages located on the slopes of Mt Merapi, but also in valleys that
start on the flanks of the volcano. Because the most affected
people usually do not want to move outside their village after the
crisis, improvement projects have to be designed close to affected
areas but in safe locations. At the time of the surveys, most of
these projects were conceived as temporary. The lack of funds has
led transitory choices to become perennial decisions. After the
2010 Merapi eruption and lahars, we distinguish between tem-
porary housing (hunian sementara) and permanent housing (hu-
nian tetap) that differ in their locations and construction materials.
3.3.4. Institutions
Co-ordination among institutions is mainly oriented towards
relief operations (e.g. information dissemination, financial com-
pensation) and repairing damage (e.g. building shelters) resulting
from volcanic eruptions and rain-triggered lahars. The re-
spondents mentioned a number of institutions that we divided
into three categories of institutions (Table 7): Local Government
(LG), Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and Community Re-
presentatives (CR). They underline the presence of International
institutions and NGOs, e.g. the Indonesian Red Cross.
The respondents included in our survey believe that Local
Government (LG) and Community Representatives (CR) are the
most important institutions since they are linked to major ad-
ministrative institutions (e.g. Central Government) and have the
legitimacy to act. In addition, some of the respondents consider
that the Indonesian Red Cross is the most important institution as
it maintains partnerships with other international institutions
such as the Danish Red Cross. However, others chose Civil Society
Organizations (CSO) over LG or CR because they have no bureau-
cracy constraints and can provide quick support (money, food) to
local inhabitants.
According to the respondents, the institutions that should first
react when lahars occur are: neighbors, local authorities (village
chief, rescue team, personalities), and Sub-District authorities. ThisTable 8
Means and localities used for the dissemination of information, as generated by
Tropes software. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of occurrences.
Dissemination of
information
Examples
Means Public meetings (17), Radio (15), Television (14),
Evacuation simulation (13), Press (12), Posters (11).
Localities Public places (15), Mosques (12), Schools, Work pla-
ces, Police stations (12), Houses (11), Health centers
(9) and Associations (sport, politics) (5).
Key: A wide range of communication supports is used to inform people in all re-
levant places where they spend time (e.g. home, schools, public administrations,
worship spaces).
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cial networks and bottom-up relationships. However, a number of
limitations persist. The hierarchical system of the Indonesian dis-
aster management (Fig. 3) may lead to bureaucracy, which does
not favour an early response and may facilitate corruption.
Moreover, our respondents asserted that most of constructions are
set up illegally and without property rights in areas reported to be
dangerous according to contingency plans. Such situation gener-
ated conflicts for the compensation and relocation of victims.
3.3.5. Information and skills
The dissemination of information among institutions and po-
pulation is provided by a wide variety of means, persons and lo-
calities (Table 8). During the emergency response period in 2010,
orders to evacuate were permanently communicated through a
variety of direct communication channels (e.g. public meetings,
radio and TV announcements) and as a result many thousands of
lives could be saved.
Information and skills around Mt. Merapi are generated by a
beneficial co-operation between scientists and communities by
using reliable scenarios and instruments (e.g. social networks,
radio, mobile phones). This self-organization facilitates the dis-
semination of warnings among people living in hazard-prone
areas before the arrival of a lahar. Hence, maps and evacuation
plans are regularly updated and posted in villages. As a result, theTable 9
The assessment framework of the adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi volcano.
Key parameters Facilitating factors to an adaptive capacity of Mt. Mera
System description 1. Well-defined system.
2. Perception of volcanic eruption as a potential risk.
Technology 1. Monitoring and warning systems exist in all rivers t
Merapi volcano.
2. Mapping using GPS.
3. Community awareness of “disaster management” dev
Infrastructure 1. Infrastructural projects have been conducted (e.g. bu
shelters, provide clean water and determine evacuat
Institutions 1. Presence of International institutions (e.g. Indonesia
2. Co-ordination among institutions especially when d
3. CSO provide quick support to local inhabitants.
4. Co-ordination among institutions for the disseminat
information.
5. Training of disaster management units (national and
6. Social networks among the population.
7. Community-based disaster and crisis management
Information and skills 1. Information dissemination with a variety of means a
2. Preparation of evacuation maps and emergency sim
3. Education for disaster management.
Economic and financial
resources
1. Financial compensation provided by a wide range of
(including social capital/local community funds/rese
disaster).
2. Financial compensation can take different forms suc
clothes.
Key: This table evaluates the adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi. Although a number
have been undertaken, a number of limitations persist (e.g. lack of facilities, poor infrasmajority of the respondents (89%) believe in the correctness of the
delivered information. However, our respondents mentioned a
number of limitations, such as imprecise documentation for both
human and material loss, and incompleteness of the delivered
information. It implies that the authorities give the priority to the
study of volcanic hazards compared to the study of vulnerability,
which is more complex.
3.3.6. Economic and financial resources
Financial resources are a key component for the management
of a volcanic crisis. They are needed before an eruption for pre-
vention purposes (education, dams, roads, signs), during an event
for emergencies (evacuation, relocation, first aid) and after for
recovery (compensation, rehabilitation, improvement projects).
However, the lack of economic and financial resources appears to
be a weakness for the adaptive capacity at Mt. Merapi.
In the Indonesian system, financial resources devoted to nat-
ural disasters are allocated on a case-to-case basis before and after
a disaster [51]. Because resources are not perennial, local institu-
tions have to ask for support from private companies (TV chan-
nels) or foreign institutions (NGOs). When a large disaster occurs,
the government applies a compensation process that is channeled
with a top-down approach as follows: the District, the Sub-Dis-
trict, and the village, then to the victims. Due to bureaucratic
constraints, all necessary funds do not arrive in a timely fashionpi system Limiting factors to an adaptive capacity of Mt. Merapi system
1. Complex interactions across institutions of different scales
(e.g. local institutions).
2. Eruptions and lahars pose complex, uncertain and ambig-
uous risks.
hat drain the
ices/technology.
1. Electric shortage.
2. Seismograph out of order.
3. Lack of advanced technology.
4. Many early warning devices were stolen and/or vandalized.
ild temporary
ion routes).
1. Lack of adequate infrastructure (e.g. dams, bridges, soil
protection, roads, river excavators, public bathing, shelters).
n Red Cross).
isasters occur.
ion of
local levels).
1. Presence of bureaucracy in LG.
2. Lack of respect for law enforcement.
3. Limitation of CSO to projects and short-term activities.
4. Co-ordination efforts among institutions are only oriented
towards relief (emergency management).
5. Time wasting in coordinating different institutions.
6. Absence of continuous contact between institutions.
7. Population relies on informal local networks (neighbors) for
rescue.
nd localities.
ulations.
1. Lack of public awareness in reacting to emergency
simulations.
2. Unprecise quantitative documentation.
3. Emergency plan depends to a large extent on CSO and CR.
institutions
rves in case of
h as food,
1. Time wasting in delivering the compensation.
2. Dependence on funds from external parties.
3. Absence of sophisticated financial coverage such as cata-
strophe bonds.
4. Limited commercial, industrial and agricultural activities.
of actions (e.g. evacuation simulations, co-ordination efforts between institutions)
tructure).
D. Bakkour et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13 (2015) 167–188178and villages have to rely on solidarity, which is material such as
food and clothes. However, for the villages located near to the
Merapi summit, many villagers have livestock as saving that they
sell during crisis periods. They also have public saving either in
cash or livestock [52].
The system could be improved with the generalization of basic
mechanisms such as reserve and solidarity funds at the local and
national scales. These two solutions are the most cited by the re-
spondents (respectively 46% and 29%). In a developing country,
blocking funds for an uncertain use may not be easily understood,
but Indonesia faces many eruptions each year at the national scale.
Insurance policies are not considered as a reliable way to hedge
risk because of the amount of premiums compared to the standard
of living and the cultural change they represent [53]. At the mo-
ment, only a micro-insurance scheme devoted to flood risk is
available in some parts of Indonesia [54]. Besides, a large number
of the respondents (59%) cannot formulate any estimate of the
human loss that an eruption or a lahar can cause. In order to es-
timate the amount of material and human loss, inhabitants refer to
maps, which indicate the number of houses located near the river.4. Discussion
Our analysis has revealed challenges that a major disaster such
as a rapid and larger-than-expected eruption may pose and solu-
tions needed to improve the capacity of a system to cope with
future crises. Lessons learned at Mt. Merapi after the 2010 erup-
tion may be useful to improve the ability of risk management in-
stitutions to deal with volcanic eruptions and other disasters.
Based on this analysis, Table 9 summarizes the facilitating and
limiting factors to an “improved” or “more efficient” adaptive ca-
pacity of a system.
Table 9 highlights different ways by which the adaptive capa-
city, and thus the adaptive governance, of a system can be im-
proved. For effective response in the future, it is necessary to work
further with communities to develop strategies that they will ac-
cept and comply with. Several steps can be taken in the future to
improve future evacuations, such as: (1) a more complete in-
tegration of disaster risk reduction education into school curricu-
lum, (2) a development of an updated disaster database which
includes loss, (3) a better and maintained facilities (roads, IDP
camps, etc.), (4) a more effective dissemination of accurate in-
formation, and (5) an elaboration of multiple hazard scenarios for
contingency not only for pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) but
also for lahars at local scale (desa/dusun).
Besides, inhabitants living on and around Mt. Merapi are likely
to have adapted in various ways to their hazardous environment.
Interpretations of risks are shaped by their own experience, per-
sonal feelings and values, cultural beliefs and interpersonal and
societal dynamics [55]. The available choices in everyday-life are
perceived to present greater threats to survival than the threat
posed by natural hazards. The need for securing daily livelihoods
prevails over volcanic risk perception while religious beliefs enable
people to cope with the threat by providing alternative explana-
tions at the time of a disaster [56]. Furthermore, lahars produced
by rains on the Merapi volcano bring a valuable resource to
communities of villagers, who are ready to increase their exposure
to hazard by quarrying deposits in valleys filled by lahar deposits.
However, results provided in this study may be very context-
dependent. Our sample of 18 face-to-face interviews with key
actors of the management of volcanic crisis, especially the 2010
Merapi eruption, does not pretend to be representative of the
population living around Mt. Merapi. Despite these limitations, our
results stay in line with other studies undertaken on the eruption
and its management. According to Mei et al. [40], the 2010 Merapivolcano eruption provided another example of a successful eva-
cuation. Such a rapid evacuation and displacement of hundreds of
thousands of people had not been tested before in a highly ha-
zardous explosive eruption [57]. An efficient community-based
hazard management prevented significant human loss [42].5. Conclusion
This study has examined the adaptive capacity and the adaptive
governance of a system. We have developed and applied an as-
sessment framework of the adaptive capacity of a system, poten-
tially exposed to disasters using six complementary criterias. The
case study focused on Merapi in the densely populated island of
Java, Indonesia, which can be considered as an example of adap-
tive governance facing the frequency of explosive eruptions of this
volcano. The 2010 Merapi eruption was much larger and longer
than anticipated by contingency planners. Before the 2010 erup-
tion, the contingency plan for each district (kabupaten) was only
limited on PDC scenario. The choice of this case study seems to be
relevant because the 2010 Merapi eruption has caused various
consequences, including environmental degradation, loss of life
and property. We were able to carry out surveys with the main
actors of the Merapi rescue system only three months after this
major event.(1) During the crisis, confusion and disruptions of networks and
infrastructures revealed the need to prepare for larger-than-
normal eruptions. Our results showed that preparation before
the eruption was critical to the management of the eruption
because lives could be saved and people at risk could be re-
located. The adaptive capacity of Merapi system could be
evaluated as quiet acceptable. However, rating an adaptive
governance system as successful is not only based on the
number of lives saved, but also on the way actors behave and
their reaction during the crisis (evacuation, transportation,
first aid, relocation, etc.).(2) Enhancement of the adaptive capacity factors may improve
the Merapi governance system in order to deal with future
eruptions. In particular, a greater emphasis should be made on
the evaluation of overall vulnerability around the volcano,
leading to a rapid enlargement of the restricted zone, and on
the development of a financial system able to cope more ef-
ficiently with disasters.(3) The theoretical aspect of our research leads to a deep under-
standing of the concept of adaptive governance. In applying
the adaptive capacity assessment framework to the aftermath
of the 2010 Merapi eruption, this article combines both theo-
retical and practical aspects.(4) This work represents a contribution to interdisciplinary re-
search for the management of natural and man made disasters
(e.g. environmental and industrial disasters). The assessment
framework of the adaptive capacity, however, is applicable to
any system of equal complexity. Government, policy makers,
and other stakeholders may use this approach in developing
and assessing critical reforms in the decision-making process.Acknowledgements
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